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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents two unique sets of fault injections on mission-critical
computer systems with the goal of (1) understanding the impact of faults,
errors and failures, and (2) evaluating fault-tolerance and resilience of the
targeted systems in the presence of failures.
Our first fault injection campaign studies the effects of failures on high-
performance computing (HPC) systems. We target the Cray XE Blue Waters
JYC testbed at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications, with
the goal of improving the understanding of failure causes and propagation
observed in the field failure data analysis of Blue Waters. We use data col-
lected from system logs and network performance counters to (1) characterize
fault-error-failure sequences and recovery mechanisms in Gemini intercon-
nection networks and in Cray compute elements, (2) understand the impact
of failures on the system and user applications at different scales, and (3)
identify and recreate fault scenarios that induce unrecoverable failures, to
create new tests for system and application design. We utilize HPCArrow,
a newly developed software-implemented fault injection tool with the ability
to disable and restore user-specified network links, directional connections,
compute nodes and blades. We observe failures manifesting in the form of
applications not making forward progress and network quiescence operations
causing extended system recovery times.
Our second fault injection campaign studies the effects of faults, attacks
and failures on a smart power grid utilizing software-defined networking
(SDN) to orchestrate its data acquisition network. We evaluate our fault
models on a smart power grid simulation running Raincoat, an SDN applica-
tion that reroutes and spoofs network traffic to thwart attackers. Addition-
ally, we propose an application- and data plane-based solution to pro-actively
monitor system state and enforce user defined policies. We show that under
certain faults, (1) applications orchestrating the network become ineffective,
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and (2) periodically monitoring the state of the network can identify faults
or attacks before they manifest as failures. The results obtained from this
work can aid in enhancing the resiliency of future SDN applications.
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Large-scale computing clusters, high-performance computer systems, and
software-defined flexible and programmable networks are an important com-
puting enterprise in a wide variety of application domains ranging from arti-
ficial intelligence and machine learning to traditional high-performance com-
puting applications such as weather forecasting and molecular dynamics.
Partial or complete failures in any component of these systems in mission-
critical environments can have significant social and societal implications.
An increasing reliance on highly critical computer systems underscores the
need for robust and effective techniques to evaluate their resiliency and mit-
igate attacks and failures. A broad approach for assessing the resilience of
large-scale systems is fault injection [1].
In this thesis, we present two unique sets of fault injections on mission-
critical computer systems: (1) the Blue Waters JYC testbed, a Cray XE
high-performance computing (HPC) system, and (2) a software-defined net-
working (SDN) enabled smart power grid. We summarize our fault injection
campaigns in Table 1.1. While our underlying approach to evaluating the
resiliency of our target systems is the same, we develop separate injection
tools and analysis methods which enable us to adapt to specific intricacies
presented by the different systems.
Table 1.1: Summary of Fault Injection Campaigns































Fault injection (FI) is a reliability evaluation technique used to study system
behaviors by deliberately and systematically introducing faults into various
levels or components of a target system. Deliberately introducing faults al-
lows system designers to (1) evaluate the correctness of fault-tolerance mecha-
nisms employed by the system, (2) understand fault-error-failure propagation
paths, and (3) assess system vulnerability to resulting failure scenarios.
Fault injection methods have been widely used to investigate fault-to-
failure propagation and to quantify the impact of failures on applications
and systems. As the complexity of newer systems increases, more rigorous
and formal techniques like model checking, state-space searching and theorem
proving become infeasible due to the immense effort required. Fault injec-
tion methods remain feasible as they allow researchers to control fault con-
ditions, workload executions and instrumentation on target systems. Many
past works have been successful in evaluating the resiliency of complex sys-
tems, such as computer processors [2], [3], software programs [4], operating
systems [5], dynamic memory [6], stream processing [7], genomic sequencing
[8], and surgical robots [9].
1.2 Challenges in Assessing System Resilience
A number of challenges exist when studying the resiliency of large and com-
plex systems. System modeling approaches, while useful in the early design
stage, often fall short of providing the ability to perform in-depth analysis
of a system or its interacting components. While analysis of field data is
usually the preferred approach, researchers often fail in connecting failure
events with their root causes or precursor faults. Additionally, existing log-
ging mechanisms may not account for all influencing factors and may not
provide a complete view of the system being studied. Furthermore, as the
complexity of newer systems increases, more rigorous and formal techniques
like model checking, state-space searching and theorem proving require an
increasing amount of effort, both computationally and on part of researchers.
Fault injection methods provide researchers the ability to study the system
under isolated faults, with complete control over experiment parameters, tar-
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get components, workloads, and type of injected faults. This degree of control
also allows researchers to verify deterministic system behavior under faults
and failures, with the ability to repeat experiments and reproduce scenar-
ios observed in production systems. However, fault injection also requires
direct access to target systems in isolation, which may be prohibitive for
those in mission-critical spaces. Additionally, poorly designed fault injection
campaigns with low system coverage may not uncover all possible failure
scenarios. Nonetheless, fault injection methods remain effective as they offer
researchers the unique ability to study the impact of faults, errors and fail-
ures under controlled conditions on the target system and connect observed
events to root causes.
1.3 Contributions
The work presented in this thesis focuses on utilizing fault injection methods
to improve our understanding of the impact of faults, errors and failures on
(1) high-performance computers and (2) software-defined networking enabled
power grids. The key research contributions of this thesis are:
• A hierarchical understanding of systems targeted in this work, in order
to guide component selection during fault injection experiment design
and preparation.
• Newly developed fault injection tools and approaches, to enable execu-
tion of fault injection experiments. We present toolkits for fault injec-
tions on HPC systems (HPCArrow) and SDN-enabled power grids.
• Analyses methodologies and tools, to collect and analyze system, net-
work, and application-level logs after injection. We build analysis tools
and scripts around existing applications, such as LogDiver [10] and
Wireshark [11].
• A smart power grid network simulator, composed of Mininet [12], the
Pox SDN controller [13], OpenVSwitch (OVS) switches [14], and Au-
tomatak DNP3 Applications [15], to provide a simulation environment
for fault injection experiments.
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• Resiliency recommendations based on our findings, to improve the
fault-tolerance of our target systems and mitigate attacks and failure
scenarios discovered in this work.
1.4 Lessons Learned
Over the course of the work presented in this thesis, we encountered several
challenges that required new approaches and methodologies. We summarize
our observations and experiences in this section.
• On large proprietary systems, fault-error-failure propagation paths are
often complex and not well documented. System fault-tolerance and
recovery mechanisms are not well understood and have a high degree
of uncertainty.
• To ensure reasonable coverage when studying complex systems, fault
injection experiments must either (1) account for all parameters in an
experiment, or (2) intelligently select experiment parameters to maxi-
mize the number of impactful injections.
• A significant number of system, network, and application logs are gen-
erated for each fault injection experiment. Analyzing the collected logs
requires specialized tools and much human involvement. Additionally,
existing tools often prove to be insufficient and require extensions to
be developed for use with specific systems.
• Complex systems usually contain a large number of highly individual-
ized components, each requiring a specialized understanding to work
with. Often, the implementation of a component may deviate from
a manufacturer’s documentation or specification, requiring additional
efforts to integrate into our overall study.
• Fault injection tools and analysis methods need to be constantly up-
dated as software and systems evolve over time. Updates to individual




An important continuation of the work presented in this thesis is evaluating
the feasibility and trade-offs of resiliency recommendations made in Chap-
ters 2 and 3, especially as systems grow in scale and features. Looking be-
yond the target systems studies, efforts could be made to generalize tools and
analysis methodologies developed in this work. Future directions of specific
projects are further documented in Chapters 2 and 3.
1.6 Terminology
In this section, we define terms specific to fault injection methods and ap-
proaches. These terms are further used in Chapters 2 and 3. Definitions of
dependability terms below are derived from [16].
• Reliability: Probability that a system will continue functioning cor-
rectly over time.
• Error: Deviation from correct functioning of a system.
• Fault: Hypothesized cause of an error in a system.
• Malicious Fault or Attack: Faults deliberately introduced with the
objective of causing harm to a system.
• Failure: A transition from correct functioning of a system to incorrect
functioning, due to an error.
• Fault Tolerance: Ability of a system to avoid failures in the presence
of faults.
• Failover: A fault tolerance strategy whereby a system utilizes a sec-
ondary or redundant component when a primary component fails.
• Injection experiment: An experiment consisting of an introduction
of one or more faults in a deliberate and controlled manner, with the
intention of studying resulting effects of the introduced fault(s) on the
system.
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• Baseline experiment: An experiment performed without a fault in-
jection, with the intention of studying the behavior of an error-free
system.
• Workload: An application or system execution during an experiment
to mimic real-world operation of a system.
• Application set: A set of applications with specified configurations
and input parameters.
• Fault injection campaign: A set of one or more fault injection and
baseline experiments with varying parameters for each experiment.
• Recovery: Handling of an error or failure to maintain reliable opera-
tion of a system. Errors and failures can be handled by masking their
effects or restoring the system to an error-free state.
• Restoration: Restoration of a system to an error or failure-free state.
In Chapter 2, we distinguish between automatic recoveries invoked by
the system in response to injected faults, and manual restoration of
target components by a user after an experiment has concluded.
1.7 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents our
work on understanding the impact of failures on the Cray Gemini platform
via fault injections on JYC, a Blue Waters testbed system at the National
Center for Supercomputing Applications. Chapter 3 presents fault injections
and failure scenarios of the Raincoat application on an SDN-enabled smart
electric power grid simulation. Additionally, we propose several resiliency
recommendations to mitigate failure scenarios discovered in our analysis.
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CHAPTER 2
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF
FAILURES THROUGH FAULT
INJECTIONS ON CRAY GEMINI SYSTEMS
This chapter presents a set of fault injection experiments performed on the
Cray XE Blue Waters JYC testbed at the National Center for Supercomput-
ing Applications (NCSA). We use this experimental campaign to improve the
understanding of failure causes and propagation observed in the field failure
data analysis of NCSA Blue Waters. We use data collected from system logs
and network performance counters to (1) characterize fault-error-failure se-
quences and recovery mechanisms in Gemini interconnection networks and in
Cray compute elements, (2) understand the impact of failures on the system
and user applications at different scales, and (3) identify and recreate fault
scenarios that induce unrecoverable failures, to create new tests for system
and application design. In this work, we injected faults through our newly de-
veloped tool, HPCArrow, with the ability to disable and restore user-specified
network links, directional connections, compute nodes and blades. We ob-
serve failures manifesting in the form of applications not making forward
progress (i.e. crashes and hangs) and network quiesces causing extended
system recovery times.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 in-
troduces the resiliency challenges associated with HPC interconnection net-
works. Section 2.2 summarizes related work that addresses HPC resilience
and fault injection methods applied to large scale systems. Section 2.3
presents a motivation for this work. Section 2.4 provides an overview of the
Cray XE system- and network-level architecture, including fault tolerance,
detection and recovery mechanisms. Section 2.5 describes the network and
compute related fault models studied in this work. Section 2.6 describes the
features and functionality of our developed HPC fault injection and recovery
tool, and Section 2.7 describes our analysis of collected application, system
and performance logs. Sections 2.8 and 2.9 present details and results of our
fault injection campaign on the JYC testbed, and make recommendations to
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address resiliency issues uncovered in this project. Finally, we conclude in
Sections 2.10 and 2.11.
2.1 Introduction
As HPC systems evolve beyond petascale computing, several resiliency con-
cerns at the system, network and application levels remain unaddressed.
With exascale systems around the corner, we expect error rates to continue
increasing to a point where traditional application-level checkpointing ap-
proaches will become unsustainable [17], [18]. To overcome the upper bound
of reliability of an HPC system (i.e. the “reliability wall”, as discussed in
[18]), the HPC community needs a better understanding of fault-to-failure
scenarios and improved system instrumentation for detecting and mitigating
errors.
Past analyses of recovery mechanisms of interconnection systems have
shown the criticality of network-related failures in Cray XE platforms by
providing empirical evidence of the impact of those failures on applications
and systems [19]. However, understanding of fault-to-failure scenarios and
their impact based on production data is limited. Analyses are ultimately
constrained to naturally occurring events while the logging and monitoring
capabilities of these systems do not provide enough information to com-
pletely map the fault-propagation path leading up to failures. In the case of
multiple errors and failures, it becomes even more difficult to diagnose such
fault-to-failure propagation paths.
In this work, we focus on improving our understanding of faults, errors
and failures on interconnection networks of HPC systems by conducting a
fault injection campaign on the Cray XE Blue Waters JYC testbed at the
National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA). As part of this
project, we developed HPCArrow, a software-implemented fault injection
(SWIFI)[20] tool to inject faults and control recoveries of system components
at various levels. Our injection campaign consisted of 84 unique experiments
(15 baseline and 69 injection experiments), spanning 5 months and requiring
4,656 node hours on the target system. Over the course of our campaign,
9 unique applications were executed a total of 462 times to provide realistic
workload scenarios as we injected faults into system components. In total,
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69 faults were injected into link, connection, node and blade components to
study the effects of faults, errors and failures across the system.
The key contributions of this project are:
• Network and compute fault injection tool for large-scale HPC
systems: We designed and developed HPCArrow, a fault injection tool
and methodology that can inject one or more faults into user-specified
links, connections, nodes, and blades on an HPC system. HPCArrow
also handles workload generation and automated fault injections with
user-defined timing requirements. Injected faults are usually accom-
panied by restore procedures to return the target system to the state
prior to fault injection. The tool currently supports failure injections on
Cray platforms with Gemini and Aries interconnects. HPCArrow was
successfully used to investigate and validate failure scenarios presented
in [19], [21], [10] and establish in-depth fault-to-failure propagation
and delays. Specific modules of this tool and their functionality are
discussed in Section 2.6.
• Assessing susceptibility of HPC runtime frameworks to faults,
failures and errors: Given the distributed nature of HPC applica-
tions, application runtime frameworks are commonly used to improve
communication efficiency and reduce development complexity. Run-
time frameworks provide varying degrees of fault tolerance, load bal-
ancing, power awareness, and automatic overlap of communication with
computation [22]. In this work, we consider workloads based on vari-
ations of the message passing interface (MPI), Charm++ and parti-
tioned global address space (PGAS) runtime frameworks. We observe
that some frameworks are more susceptible to application hangs and
crashes than others. We attempt to correlate abnormal behaviors such
as premature terminations and hangs in application executions to hard-
ware and network-level errors. These results are further discussed in
Section 2.9.
• Recommendation for notification of errors at application and
system levels: Results from our experiments revealed a lack of re-
porting of network-related errors, resulting in a lack of real-time feed-
back to applications. Extended component and system recovery dura-
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tions present an opportunity to report information to an application
or system monitoring service, which could improve their response to
network-related failures. Placing additional detectors and/or a notifi-
cation system on the health supervisory system (HSS) could be used to
trigger higher-level recovery mechanisms and transmit low-level fault
information to the system management workstation (SMW).
• Identification of critical errors and conditions: The analyses of
error data obtained from our fault injection campaign identified critical
errors and conditions that can be used to provide real-time feedback to
applications and resource management services. For example, (1) at the
system level, one can detect and send notifications of application hang
conditions, and (2) at the application level, one can send notifications
of critical errors that can lead to corruption or unexpected terminations
of applications.
2.2 Literature Review
This project is motivated by a number of past studies on the reliability
of HPC systems, especially those on Cray platforms and interconnects. In
this section, we outline existing literature and work related to this study.
Table 2.1 summarizes the literature reviewed as part of this study.
The fault models, tools and analysis methodologies used in this work are
based on past fault injection campaigns on Cielo, a Cray XE supercomputer
at Los Alamos (LANL) and Sandia (SNL) National Laboratories [23]. The
work presented in this chapter is part of the Holistic, Measurement-Driven
Resilience (HMDR) project, a collaboration between the University of Illi-
nois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC); Sandia (SNL), Los Alamos (LANL),
and Lawrence Berkeley (LBNL) National Laboratories; and Cray Inc. Other
fault injection campaigns on HPC systems have injected faults at the memory
[24], [25], processor [25], [26], [27], and application [4], [28] levels. A num-
ber of narrow studies [29], [30] have investigated faults and failures on the
message-passing interface (MPI). The work presented in this chapter takes
a holistic approach to studying faults and failures across various levels of
system components and application runtime frameworks.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Literature Reviewed for Work Presented in
Chapter 2
Title Comments
[10] LogDiver: A Tool for Mea-
suring Resilience of Extreme-
Scale Systems and Applica-
tions
Presents LogDiver for analyzing
application-level resiliency on HPC
systems.
[17] Addressing Failures in Exas-
cale Computing
Presents a summary of system and
application resilience in HPCs, es-
tablishes taxonomy and discusses er-
ror prevention, detection, and recov-
ery.
[18] The Reliability Wall for Ex-
ascale Supercomputing
Quantifies the effects of reliability on
performance and generalizes a “reli-
ability wall” for exascale systems.
[19] Analysis of Gemini Intercon-
nect Recovery Mechanisms
Characterizes recovery mechanisms
of Gemini interconnects from raw
system logs.
[21] Lessons Learned from the
Analysis of System Failures
at Petascale
Analyzes failures and impact on Blue
Waters. Concludes with software be-
ing the main cause of failures.
[31] Measuring and Understand-
ing Extreme-Scale Applica-
tion Resilience
Characterizes resiliency of HPC ap-
plication runs on Blue Waters by an-
alyzing system- and application-level
logs.





Reviews the failure rates of HPCs
and surveys fault tolerance ap-
proaches like rollback-recovery tech-
niques.
[33] A Large-Scale Study of Fail-
ures in High-Performance
Computing Systems
Analyzes failure data of two HPC
systems and reports time and rates
of failures and repairs.
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2.3 Motivation
Application resilience in current HPC systems is primarily achieved through
checkpointing to mitigate software and hardware failures [32]. This brute-
force approach allows applications to revert back to a previous error-free
state upon encountering system-level failures. Application-level checkpoint-
ing is the preferred resilience mechanism due to difficulties with designing and
implementing fault tolerance at the programming framework level (e.g., the
MPI User Level Failure Mitigation approach [34]). However, this checkpoint-
and-restart approach comes with high overheads and performance penalties,
especially as we move to exascale systems with a larger number of compo-
nents. Because of the evolutionary nature of HPC technologies, it is expected
that systems, for the foreseeable future, will continue to have fault mecha-
nisms and behaviors similar to those found in current deployments [35]. Thus,
comparisons of well-explored failure scenarios across multiple generations of
systems should enable identification of persistent high impact fault scenar-
ios. Tailoring instrumentation and resilience techniques to enhance system
and application resilience characteristics in these high impact scenarios can
enhance the efficiency and throughput of both current and future platform
architectures.
System recovery mechanisms that are defined and implemented by HPC
platform vendors are typically not well understood or characterized by their
signatures in log files and platform measurables in terms of durations, im-
pacts, and success rates, particularly for complex fault scenarios. A number
of studies have explored system logs from large-scale HPC systems ([21],
[33], [36]), but connecting failures with their root causes or precursor faults
has proven difficult. The resulting fault-to-failure path models are rarely
complete, and there is a significant amount of associated uncertainty. In
addition, built-in, automatically triggered recovery mechanisms can further
obscure failure paths and may leave no trace in the log files typically used by
system administrators and made available to researchers. The research com-
munity needs a way to verify, and possibly augment, failure models through
testing in a controlled environment. In particular, the community needs tools
to enable documented and repeatable HPC environment configurations, in-
cluding instrumentation and applications placement, and injection of known
faults in a repeatable non-destructive manner on large scale HPC systems.
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Figure 2.1: Cray XE platform architecture [21]
2.4 Architecture Overview
This section provides an architecture overview of the Cray XE platform us-
ing Gemini interconnection networks. We also document the fault tolerance
mechanisms present in Cray XE systems as well as fault detection and re-
covery processes in later subsections.
2.4.1 System Architecture
Cray XE systems are hierarchically organized into cabinets, chassis and
blades, as shown in Fig. 2.1. The high-speed network (HSN) of a Cray
XE system is laid out as a anisotropic 3-D torus. Each Cray XE6/XK7
blade consists of four compute nodes, two Gemini Application Specific In-
tegrated Circuits (ASICs), each housing two Network Interface Controllers
(NICs) and a 48-port router. NICs are attached to nodes using a Hyper-
Transport 3 host interface. Each Gemini ASIC is connected to the network
by means of 10 torus connections, two each in X+, X–, Z+, Z– and one each
in Y+ and Y–. An ASIC also connects two nodes internally using NICs.
Each connection is composed of four links and each link is composed of three
single-bit bidirectional lanes. Thus, each connection consists of 12 lanes, and
ASICs connect to one another on the network via 24 lanes in the X and Z
dimensions, and 12 lanes in the Y dimension. Further details of the Cray XE
platform architecture may be found in [19].
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2.4.2 Fault Tolerance and Resiliency
Cray XE systems provide several levels of fault tolerance via software-level
supervisory services, hardware-level error corrections and network-level re-
dundancy.
2.4.2.1 Hardware Supervisor System (HSS) and System Resiliency
Features
The Hardware Supervisor System (HSS) is a collection of hardware compo-
nents responsible for monitoring compute nodes. The HSS consists of:
(i) Blade-level (L0) and cabinet-level (L1) controllers (see Fig. 2.1), which
monitor their housed nodes, reply to heartbeat signal requests and col-
lect data on temperature, voltage, power, network performance coun-
ters, and runtime software exceptions,
(ii) the HSS manager, which collects node health data and executes man-
agement software, and
(iii) the HSS network, which connects blade and cabinet-level controllers to
the HSS manager.
The behavior of the HSS upon detection of failures is presented in Sec-
tion 2.4.3. Further details of the HSS and system resiliency features can
be found in [21].
2.4.2.2 Hardware-Level Error Correction
Network traffic passing through Gemini ASICs is protected by a 16-bit cyclic
redundancy check (CRC). For each network packet, the CRC computation is
performed upon arrival at a Gemini ASIC and between the transition from
NIC to router. Similar to the common transport control protocol (TCP),
Gemini ensures reliable delivery of packets by using the sliding window pro-
tocol. Further, memory regions (except router table buffers) are protected
via single error correction-double error detection (SEC-DED) [37].
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2.4.2.3 Network-Level Redundancy
To ensure successful delivery of packets, Gemini ASICs connect to one an-
other via two redundant connections in the X and Z dimensions, and one
connection in the Y dimension. Each connection is composed of two redun-
dant links, each with three redundant lanes. These layers of redundancy
allow network communication to continue in degraded mode with just one
active link with active one lane.
2.4.3 Fault Detection and Recovery
In this work, we investigate failures in compute nodes and blades and network
links, ASICs and connections in isolation as well as in combination. Cray
XE systems handle such failures by triggering automatic recovery processes.
Failures, depending on where they occur, are detected by a supervisory block
on the router ASIC, a blade controller (BC) on a blade, or a system man-
agement workstation (SMW). Each BC is locally connected to a supervisory
block on the router ASIC, and remotely connected to the SMW through the
Cray hardware supervisory system (HSS) network. Blade controllers detect
failed links and power loss to mezzanine cards housing Gemini ASICs, and
deliver information about critical failures to the SMW in order to initiate
associated recovery procedures.
Upon detection of a network-related failure, the SMW initiates a system-
wide recovery. Actions taken by the SMW during the recovery process de-
pend on the type of failures described in the following sections.
2.4.3.1 Lane Failure
Each link in a Gemini network consists of three single-bit bidirectional lanes,
allowing it to tolerate up to two lane failures and continue to operate in
degraded mode. For each lane failure, the L0 blade controller logs a failure
event and triggers a lane recovery up to a fixed number of times (defined
by the system administrator). If a lane recovery is unsuccessful, the lane is
marked “permanently failed”. Upon failure of all three lanes, the L0 blade
controller marks the link as inactive and triggers a link failover instead of






























Figure 2.2: State transition diagram for lane recovery procedure, derived
from [19]
state transition diagram in Fig. 2.2.
2.4.3.2 Link Failover
A link failover is triggered by the L0 blade controller when a link becomes
inactive, due to failures of all three lanes. A link failure could be caused by a
more widespread failure in the cabinet, blade or mezzanine. It could also be
caused by corruptions in routing tables or faults in physical cables. Gemini
ASICs continue maintaining connectivity through remaining functional links.
The link failover procedure waits to aggregate failures from other compo-
nents, determines which compute blades are alive, quiesces network traffic
and attempts to find a new route. This entire procedure varies from 30 to
600 seconds, depending on the size of the system. If the link failover process
is successful, the failed link is masked and communication paths in the net-
work are restored. A failure of the link failover process, however, causes the
HSN to fail leading to a system-wide outage [19]. The link failure process is
summarized as a state transition diagram in Fig. 2.3.
2.4.3.3 Warm Swap
The warm swap process allows system administrators to manually add and
remove compute nodes and blades on the system without impacting other
























































Figure 2.3: State transition diagram for link failover procedure, derived
from [19]
connections, computes new routes, quiesces the network, installs computed
routes and unquiesces the network. During network quiescence, traffic is
suspended across all links on the network. This process is summarized as a
state transition diagram in Fig. 2.4 .
In some cases, recovery mechanisms can mask failures without causing
major system interruptions. Analyses of field failure data indicate that: (1)
recovery mechanisms handling complex failure scenarios may not always suc-
ceed, and (2) protracted recoveries that eventually succeed may still have a
significant impact on the system and applications [21].
2.5 Fault Models
In this section, we present the fault models studied in this work. We inves-
tigate failures in compute nodes and blades and network links, ASICs and
connections. We targeted failures of these compute and network components
since they occur frequently enough in production systems to be responsible












































Figure 2.4: State transition diagram of warm swap operation, derived from
[19]
2.5.1 Link Fault Model
The link fault model involves the failure of a network link between two Gemini
ASIC routers, which causes packets in flight to be dropped (see Fig. 2.5).
We recreate a link failure by deactivating a connection’s links by modifying
a status flag on either end of the target link. This emulates a scenario where
the link is intentionally deactivated by system administration software, to
prevent use of a physically damaged link or where maintenance is required.
When the status flag on one end of the target link is modified, the Gemini
ASIC on the opposite end is also affected. The link failure is detected by
the Hardware Supervisory System (HSS) which responds by masking the
target link. This causes traffic to be routed on other links on the same
connection. After the automated recovery procedure associated with link
failures completes, the link is marked as disabled on the SMW.
2.5.2 Connection Fault Model
The connection fault model considers a scenario where all network links of
a connection between two Gemini ASICs are deactivated, thereby causing a
hole in the routable topology of the system (see Fig. 2.6). The automated
recovery process responds by rerouting all traffic around the hole, via connec-
tions in other directions. For example, a failure in the Z+ direction may cause
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Figure 2.5: Link failure fault model
Figure 2.6: Connection failure fault model
all traffic to be routed via the X+, Z+, X- connections after the automated
recovery procedure completes.
2.5.3 Node Fault Model
The node fault model considers a scenario where a compute node fails and
causes an application running on the node to terminate (see Fig. 2.7). We
emulate a node failure by sending a non-maskable interrupt (NMI) to the
CPU on the target node, which causes the CPU to hang and not make forward
progress. A node failure or hang does not cause an automated recovery
procedure to be initiated as routing paths in the network remain unaffected.
However, traffic balance across surrounding nodes could be affected.
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Figure 2.7: Node failure fault model
2.5.4 Blade Fault Model
The blade fault model considers a scenario where an entire blade consisting
of four compute nodes, two Gemini ASICs and 40 network links is turned
off. We emulate this scenario by turning off the voltage regulator of the
mezzanine in the target blade via an administrative command (see Fig. 2.8).
When the target blade is powered off, an automated recovery process is
initiated to handle unavailable links. We expect the automated recovery
process to route around the failed blade. Similar to the node failure scenario
described in Section 2.5.3, we expect any applications running on the nodes
within the target blade to terminate. Additionally, traffic from other blades
passing through the target blade may be affected.

















Figure 2.9: HPCArrow toolkit and components
2.6 Fault Injection Tool - HPCArrow
A major contribution of this work is the development of HPCArrow,1 a soft-
ware implemented fault-injection (SWIFI) [20] tool and methodology that
can inject one or more faults into user-specified links, connections, nodes,
and blades on an HPC system. Injected faults are usually accompanied by
restore procedures to return the target system to the state prior to fault
injection.
HPCArrow supports execution of arbitrary failure scenarios on network
and compute components. The tool currently supports failure injections on
Cray machines with Gemini and Aries interconnects. HPCArrow consists
of three major modules (see Fig. 2.9) to systematically study the effects of
1HPCArrow was developed by Lavin Devnani (author) and Sharon Tang. HPCArrow is
based on past work by Fei Deng presented in [23] and is part of the Holistic, Measurement-
Driven Resilience (HMDR) project, a collaboration between the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign (UIUC); Sandia (SNL), Los Alamos (LANL), and Lawrence Berkeley
(LBNL) National Laboratories; and Cray Inc.
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faults and failures on HPC systems and applications:
• A Workload Manager that launches applications of varying scales
at user defined locations (nodes and blades) on the target system and
collects output logs from each application run.
• A Fault Injector that injects user-specified faults into selected net-
work or compute components and manages restoration of impacted
ones.
• An Injection Manager that automates injection experiments without
requiring user intervention between each experiment run.
We expand on the specifics of these modules in Sections 2.6.1–2.6.3.
2.6.1 Workload Manager
The Workload Manager module of HPCArrow is responsible for the exe-
cution of application workloads during fault injection, failure recovery and
restore operations for each experiment run. This module allows users to
define system resources (size, position, number and types of nodes) and ap-
plication configuration (input parameters and output logging) required for
each workload run in an HPCArrow specific format. Specifying system and
application configurations in a custom format allows HPCArrow to execute
workloads on systems with different application-level schedulers. Currently,
the Workload Manager module of HPCArrow supports MOAB/Torque [38]
and Slurm [39] application-level schedulers.
Beyond specifying configurations for individual applications, the Workload
Manager module supports invocations of multiple workloads to run simulta-
neously. Users can select a ‘set’ of applications to launch at the same time,
which allows for studying the impact of fault injections across multiple work-
loads running on different compute components.
2.6.2 Fault Injector
The fault injector module executes commands that inject faults into user-
specified system components and initiate restore processes to re-enable im-
pacted components. For multiple and sequential injections, this module is
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responsible for timing each fault injection and any subsequent recovery in-
vocations. Faults and restoration procedures are invoked via administrative
commands supplied by Cray. This module (1) translates user-selected tar-
get components into appropriate parameters for injection and recovery com-
mands, (2) executes aforementioned commands with translated parameters,
and (3) collects outputs and errors from executed commands to a centralized
injection experiment log. A summary of commands used by HPCArrow for
targeting Cray Gemini systems is provided in Appendix A.
2.6.3 Injection Manager
The Injection Manager module allows a fault injection campaign (consisting
of one or more experiments) to run without user intervention between each
experiment execution. Users can specify a series of experiments as a fault
injection campaign consisting of applications workloads, target components,
and injection/restore delays. Upon invocation of the campaign, the injection






























Figure 2.10: Injection manager workflow
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2.7 Analysis Methodology
In this work, we analyze system-generated logs as well as performance and
monitoring data provided by collection and aggregation services running at
various levels of the system. We use results from our analysis to (1) identify
appropriate components to inject upon during our preparation stage, and (2)
identify recovery status and quantify metrics after injection.
2.7.1 Component Selection
The fault injection, automated recovery and manual restore procedures de-
scribed in Section 2.5 vary in execution time on our target system from
approximately 5 minutes for single link failures to approximately 20 minutes
for blade failures. Such an extended turnaround time, combined with limited
availability of our target system, prohibits us from performing a statistically
significant number of injections on randomly selected components.
In our initial experiments, consisting of application sets 1 to 5, we targeted
workloads and components at random from all running applications for each
experiment. In the next phase, our experiments targeted application sets 6 to
8. We selected components with maximum utilization over the course of an
experiment’s lifetime to ensure that our injections are impactful. The selected
components were connections between Gemini routers with the maximum
amount of traffic (in bytes) or nodes and blades connected to Geminis with
maximum traffic.
The Lightweight Distributed Metric System (LDMS) service, described
in [40], logs traffic throughput (in bytes/second) in the X+, X–, Y+, Y–,
Z+ and Z– directions for each Gemini on the target system. To identify
components with maximum utilization over an experiment run, we first pro-
file an application without injecting faults. A smoothed time series plot of
traffic data obtained from the LDMS service allows us to visually identify
connections with high throughput and select suitable components for fault
injections.
As an example, we demonstrate the traffic throughput of an execution of
the Kripke Charm++ application running on 8 nodes. Figure 2.11 shows
smoothened traffic plots over the duration of the workload run. Applying
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Figure 2.11: Component selection example for Kripke Charm++
applications. Each plot represents network traffic for a given Gemini and
connection over application execution.
Gemini c0-0c2s1g1 in the Z+ direction or Gemini c0-0c2s2g0 in the Z–
direction, as these connections handle the maximum amount of traffic.
2.7.2 Event Analysis
To identify the occurrence and duration of injection, recovery, and restore
events, we collect and analyze the system log files provided in Table 2.2.
These system-level log files are generated by Cray logging daemons running
at multiple levels of the system, from the SMW and component controllers to
each individual compute node. We use LogDiver [10], a tool for the analysis
of system and application-level resiliency in extreme-scale environments to
identify events of interest in the collected system logs. In this study, we use
LogDiver to (1) extract network-recovery operations, determine the comple-
tion status of recoveries, and diagnose the cause of recovery failures, and (2)
identify application termination status and reasons behind abnormal termi-
nations (crashes and hangs). Prior to execution, LogDiver is configured with
regular expressions (regex) that match with events of interest in collected
system logs. These regular expressions are constructed from information
available in Cray documentation and from manual inspection of events in
collected logs [41].
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Table 2.2: System Logs Analyzed in this Study, Containing Log Names and
Content Descriptions
Log Name Content of Log File
smwmessages System Management Workstation (SMW) hardware and environmental history.
xtdiscover
Output from xtdiscover command, used to discover hardware components
and respond to changing hardware configurations.
events Generic system-level events, heartbeats, sequence identifiers.
commands Start and end timestamps of commands executed on SMW.
netwatch Timestamps of when network links become inactive.
nlrd
Timestamps and details of hardware-level errors, network-level failures,
automated recoveries and warm swaps.
All phases of automatic failure recoveries and warm swaps are logged.
2.7.3 Network Performance Counters
On Cray systems, the Lightweight Distributed Metric Service (LDMS) is
responsible for logging network performance for each Gemini connection [40].
In this study, LDMS is configured to sample traffic data (in bytes/second)
at 1-second intervals. However, LDMS logging is susceptible to node and
network failures. Node failures cause data collected by on-node daemons to
be lost if memory is overwritten or lost. Failures in the HSN (e.g. during
a network quiescence) also cause data points to be dropped. We overcome
potential data loss by exponentially smoothing traffic samples to one minute
moving averages, as described in Section 2.7.1.
2.7.4 Application Data
To analyze the impact of failures and recoveries on applications, we redi-
rect information reported on stdout and stderr to application logs for each
workload run. Applications report timestamps, computation steps, exit
reasons, and critical errors to varying degrees in their logs. Additionally,
the application-level scheduler reports global network quiescence and throt-
tling events when automatic failure recoveries or manual warm swap proce-
dures are invoked. Analysis of application-level output allows us to correlate
system-level failures and recoveries to events that occur during workload




The preceding sections of this chapter describe our general fault injection
approach and methodology, applicable to any Cray XE system. This section
presents details of a fault injection campaign conducted on the Cray XE Blue
Waters JYC testbed at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications
(NCSA). Our injection campaign consisted of 84 unique experiments, span-
ning 5 months and requiring 4,656 node hours on the target system. Out
of the 84 experiments, 15 consisted of baseline runs with no injections and
the remaining 69 were fault injection ones. The baseline results were later
used to compare system and application behavior to results obtained from
fault injection experiments. Over the course of our campaign, 9 unique ap-
plications were executed a total of 462 times to provide realistic workload
scenarios as we injected faults into system components. In total, 69 faults
were injected into link, connection, node and blade system components.
2.8.1 Target System Description
Our experimental campaign targeted JYC, a 96-node Cray XE/XK testbed
at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA). JYC is a
1-cabinet, 3 chassis machine consisting of 56 XE nodes, 28 XK nodes and 14
service nodes.
The 56 XE compute nodes are spread across 14 Cray XE6 blades, with up
to four nodes being housed per blade. Each XE node consists of 2 × 16-core
AMD Opteron 6276 processes @ 2.3 GHz. An Opteron processor is composed
of 8 dual-core AMD Bulldozer modules, with each module having a 8×64 KB
L1 instruction cache, 16×16 KB L1 data cache. The processor also includes
8×2 MB L2 caches (shared between cores of each Bulldozer module), and a
2×8 MB L3 cache (shared among all cores). Memory-wise, 64 GB of DDR3
RAM (8 × 8GB DIMMs) are installed for each compute node. The installed
memory modules are protected with x8 Chipkill code that uses eighteen 8-bit
symbols to make a 144-bit ECC word (128 data bits + 16 check bits) [37],
[42]. The L1 data, L2 and L3 data caches are also protected with ECC, while
other caches are protected with parity [21].
The 28 XK nodes are spread across 7 Cray XK7 blades with 4 nodes
















































































































Figure 2.12: JYC system overview with node types and identifiers.
A detailed representation of the system is provided in Appendix B.
Opteron 6276 processor described above. The second socket is occupied by a
NVIDIA K20X accelerator, with 2,880 single-precision CUDA cores, 64 KB
of L1 cache, 1,536 KB of dedicated L2 cache, and 6 GB of ECC protected
DDR5 RAM. Since only one socket is occupied by a general purpose CPU,
the amount of memory available to CPU tasks is halved to 32 GB (4 × 8 GB
DIMMs) when compared to XE nodes [21].
The remaining fourteen nodes are reserved for servicing the system. Twelve
out of fourteen nodes are spread across three Cray XIO blades with four nodes
per blade. These nodes consist 6-core AMD Opteron 2435 Istanbul processors
@ 2.6 GHz and x4 Chipkill 16 GB of DDR2 memory (4 × 4 GB DIMMs).
The other two service nodes contain AMD Opteron 6276 processors and are
housed alongside XE compute nodes in Cray XE6 blades [21].
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A high-level system map of JYC is provided in Fig. 2.12. We expand
on this system map by providing node identifiers and component names in
Appendix B.
2.8.2 Application Workloads
To generate sufficient network and compute activity during our experiments,
we executed several HPC benchmark applications at various scales and ob-
served their behavior before, during and after our fault injections and re-
covery invocations. The benchmark applications were chosen from different
programming frameworks and represent characteristics of real-world HPC
workloads. Each workload was tuned to run for approximately 30 minutes,
to allow for injection, automatic recovery and manual restoration operations
to execute with sufficient time.
One of the many goals of this project is to assess the susceptibility of HPC
runtime frameworks to faults, failures and errors. To this end, we select
workloads from the following frameworks:
1. Message Passing Interface (MPI) Message Passing Interface is
a communication protocol that supports point-to-point and collective
communication between compute nodes in a distributed computing sys-
tem. The MPI layer handles synchronization and communication be-
tween processes mapped onto compute nodes in a language-independent
way, with language-specific bindings. MPI remains the dominant model
used in HPCs today [43]. We specifically look at Cray, Intel and PGI
implementations of the MPI standard in our workloads.
2. Charm++
Charm++ is a C++-based parallel programming system that imple-
ments a message-driven migratable objects programming model, sup-
ported by an adaptive runtime system. Charm++ is based on a message-
driven migratable objects programming model, and consists of a C++-
based parallel notation, an adaptive runtime system that automates
resource management, a collection of debugging and performance anal-
ysis tools, and an associated family of higher level languages [44]. We
consider applications that utilize the native uGNI communication li-
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Table 2.3: Application Descriptions and Characteristics

























































PGAS Unified Parallel C FFT
brary available on Cray XE systems, with shared-memory optimiza-
tions using pthreads and Cray huge pages modules.
3. Partitioned Global Address Space (PGAS)
The PGAS programming model shares data between compute elements
by creating a global address space for shared memory. PGAS assumes a
global memory address space that is logically partitioned and a portion
of it is local to each compute element [45]. We specifically look at
applications using the Unified Parallel C (UPC) programming model
in this work.
The application benchmarks selected in this study are highly parallel work-
loads and span several scientific disciplines, from seismic simulations to molec-
ular dynamics. We summarize applications and their characteristics in Ta-
ble 2.3.
In order to study the impact of injected faults and recoveries across the
entire system, we simultaneously launched a set of workloads for each exper-
iment. Launching workloads across the entire system allows us to identify
failures propagating or cascading through the system and impacting appli-
cations running further away from the injected component. Applications
were chosen such that each set had a mix of runtime frameworks, application
sizes, and overall system utilization. In our injection campaign, the HPCAr-
row workload generator was configured with eight unique application sets.









































Figure 2.13: Fault injection timeline demonstrating user, system and
application events
2.8.3 Experiment Timeline
Experiments in our fault injection campaign consist of specifying an applica-
tion workload set, an injection type and a target component. The timeline
presented in Fig. 2.13 summarizes an example experiment run. Prior to ex-
ecution, a user configures HPCArrow with (1) the selected application set
using the Workload Manager module, and (2) the injection type, component
and delay using the Fault Injector module. At time T = 0, the selected ap-
plication set is executed by submitting workload jobs to the application-level
scheduler. The Fault Injector module waits until F seconds have elapsed
before injecting a fault into the selected component. If the injected fault
causes a component to fail, an automatic recovery procedure associated with
the component is invoked by the SMW after R seconds have elapsed. This
procedure computes new routes, quiesces the network, installs new routes,
masks failures, and finally unquiesces the network. Depending on the appli-
cation impacted, a job may crash or hang due to operations performed during
the recovery phase. At time T = MR, the manual restore procedure is in-
voked by the Fault Injector module, which re-enables the failed component
and warm-swaps it back into service. During the warm swap, the network
is once again quiesced, new routes installed and unquiesced. At the end of
our experiment (when applications terminate naturally), system-, network-
and application-level logs are collected to be analyzed offline. LogDiver is
used to generate a report containing timestamps and frequency of observed
events. In this work, we select a constant value of F = 100 seconds, which
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allows workloads to complete their initial setup and enter a steady state of
computation. The manual restoration delay (MR) is dependent on the com-
ponent type, but is configured to invoke 200 seconds after automatic recovery
is completed.
2.9 Results
This section provides a comprehensive overview of the results obtained from
our fault injection campaign. For each experiment, we apply our analysis
methodology described in Section 2.7 to characterize failures and recoveries
at the system level and analyze impact at the application level. In Sec-
tion 2.9.1, we provide a description of common hardware errors observed in
system logs collected from our experiments. In Section 2.9.2, we describe
errors reported by applications in response to injected faults and identify po-
tential causes for these errors. We summarize our fault injection campaign
in Section 2.9.3 by classifying each experiment by runtime framework and
application. Additionally, we provide timelines demonstrating network and
system activity of selected experiments for network and compute related fail-
ures. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of our observations and present
resiliency recommendations.
2.9.1 Hardware Error Descriptions
During fault injection and recovery, hardware error codes are logged by the
xtnlrd daemon running on the System Management Workstation (SMW).
The resulting nlrd system log contains a component-based history of hard-
ware errors in chronological order. We configure LogDiver with hardware
error codes to identify events of interest in our analysis. We summarize
the description of hardware errors identified in our fault injection campaign
in Table 2.4. While these errors are not critical at the system level (i.e.,
they do not cause network deadlocks or system crashes), they contextualize
application-level events observed during workload executions.
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Logged due to a failure in the HSN, due to a
failed link, connection, or node. Also logged
due to severe network congestion if conges-
tion protection mechanisms fail.
SSID Response Protocol Logged during network re-routing phase of
quiescence. Also logged when unregistered
memory (e.g. memory of terminated appli-
cation) is used for network transfers.
SSID Detected Misrouted
Packet
Logged during blade warm swap proce-
dures. Routing algorithm deliberately mis-
routes packets destined for a blade being
warm-swapped.
ORB RAM Scrubbed Up-
per/Lower Entry
Logged when a network request times out
and is removed from the output request
buffer (ORB). Indicates a problem with the
Gemini HSN. Transient error which indicates
a network deadlock if continuously gener-
ated.
BTE Descriptor Invalid Logged when a block transfer engine descrip-
tor (BTE) is invalid. This error is seen when
a node is being rebooted and the Gemini is
targeted before boot completion.
RMT Request for Invalid
Descriptor
Logged when a receive message table (RMT)
request descriptor is invalid.
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2.9.2 Application Error Descriptions
In our fault injection experiments, the HPCArrow Workload Manager is
configured to redirect application output and errors to application logs for
analysis offline. The verbosity of these logs varies depending on the appli-
cation and runtime framework used. In our analysis, we observed several
critical errors that prevented an application from making forward progress.
We summarize the observed errors in this section.
• Assertion msg nbytes > 0 failed: This message is logged by the
Charm++ runtime framework upon encountering a 0-byte sized fast
memory access (FMA) short message (SMSG) in the uGNI layer. The
uGNI layer handles low-level communication between network ASICs
and user-space software [54]. Such an error indicates that a network
packet was dropped in-flight to its destination Gemini due to a failure
in the communication path. In our experiments, we encounter this
error upon link and connection injections.
• DMAPP RC TRANSACTION ERROR: DMAPP is a communication library
which supports a logically shared, distributed memory programming
model. DMAPP provides remote memory access (RMA) between pro-
cesses within a job in a one-sided manner [54].
The DMAPP RC TRANSACTION ERROR indicates that a network transac-
tion completed with an error state, either a non-recoverable transaction
error or a transient error such as network error, uncorrectable memory
error or resource shortage [54]. The DMAPP library is used by the Uni-
fied Parallel C (UPC) runtime framework built on the PGAS model.
In our experiments, we encounter this error upon link and connection
injections.
• RCA ec node failed event: This error is generated when a node or
blade fails with a hardware error such as a memory check error (MCE).
Typically, the node is automatically marked down by the node health
checker [55]. In our experiments, this error was observed when faults
were injected into compute nodes and blades.
• ioctl(GNI IOC POST RDMA) returned error: This message is logged
by the Charm++ runtime framework upon encountering an invalid
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argument to a remote direct memory access (RDMA) transaction. This
error leads to application crashes and hangs. In our experiments, we
encounter this error upon link and connection injections.
Besides critical errors preventing applications from making forward progress,
we also observed network related messages logged to application outputs:
• Network quiesced : This message is logged when a network quiescence is
in progress, in response to a link, connection or blade being taken out
of service or added back in (i.e. during a warm swap). We observe this
message logged in response to link, connection and blade injections.
• Network throttled : This message is logged when network congestion
occurs and the network is throttled to prevent further congestion. We
observe this condition when a link, connection or blade is taken out of
service or added back in (i.e., during a warm swap).
2.9.3 Summary of Fault Injection Experiments
Our injection campaign consists of 84 fault injection and baseline experi-
ments. Over the course of our campaign, 9 unique applications were ex-
ecuted a total of 462 times to provide realistic workload scenarios as we
injected faults into system components. In total, 69 faults were injected into
link, connection, node and blade system components. Table 2.5 summarizes
fault injection experiments classified by runtime frameworks, applications,
fault models and their outcome scenarios. Of particular interest is the PS-
DNS application, which terminated prematurely when not targeted. This
observation is discussed further in Section 2.9.5. Additionally, it is worth
noting that we expect applications to terminate prematurely upon node and
blade failures. Thus, the node and blade failure results reported are not out
of the ordinary.
We also summarize events observed during each experiment at the sys-
tem, network and application levels in a tabular format. As an example, we
provide Table 2.6 generated by LogDiver that summarizes events observed
during a link injection experiment. The numbers of occurrences of system
events and errors are reported to identify any missing recovery phases during
our experiments.
35
Table 2.5: Summary of Fault Injection Campaign by Target Application,
Fault Model and Outcome Scenarios. Descriptions of Runtime Frameworks









PSDNS 8, 32 3 Link 0 0 3




3 Node/Blade 0 9
Charm++
(SMP)
NAMD 16 0 0 3 Link 3







Kripke 4, 8 5 Link 1 Node/Blade 1 Link 7















Total 23 35 11 69







Impacted Application AMR SMP (64 XE/XK)
Application Status Crash
Link Failed 4
Link Recovery Successful 4
SSID Request Timeout 635
SSID Response Protocol 62





Warm Swap Successful 6
Link Auto Recovery Duration 37 seconds
Warm Swap Duration 38 seconds
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2.9.4 Failure Scenarios
In our injection campaign, we study faults and recoveries targeting links,
connections, nodes and blades. We discuss details of experiments with inter-
esting outcomes for each fault model in the following sections.
2.9.4.1 Single Link and Single Connection Failures
For the single link failure and single connection failure fault models, we ob-
served three scenarios for application resilience: (1) impacted applications
making forward progress and terminating naturally despite link or connection
failures, (2) applications utilizing impacted links or connections terminating
prematurely, and (3) applications utilizing impacted links or connections re-
sulting in hangs (i.e. not making forward progress).
In this section, we discuss system- and network-level events that occur dur-
ing a connection failure experiment where an application utilizing the failed
connection terminates prematurely. While we do not discuss the remaining
scenarios, we apply the same analysis methodology to other experiments.
Figure 2.14 demonstrates the timeline of a connection failure experiment,
where an impacted application crashes upon a connection becoming unavail-
able. In this experiment, application set 4 was executed (see Appendix C)
and connection c0-0c1s1g0 in the Y+ direction was targeted. This experi-
ment specifically impacts the UPC-FT application running on 8 nodes, as this
workload utilizes the targeted connection during injection and recovery.
In the top plot of Fig. 2.14, three traffic curves are presented – one for the
connection that a failure was injected into, a second for remaining connec-
tions utilized by the impacted application, and third for all other connections
on the system. From time T = 0 to T = 335, we observe consistent traffic
flow on all connections. At time T = 333 seconds, a connection failure is
injected causing connection c0-0c1s1g0 to fail in the Y+ direction. Next, at
time T = 335 seconds, the automatic recovery process is triggered. This re-
covery process requires a route recalculation and network quiescence, which
temporarily suspends network traffic flow on all connections until successful
completion. At time T = 372 seconds, the automatic recovery completes by
successfully masking the impacted connection (i.e. removing the connection
from service). After completion of the automatic recovery process, traffic
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Figure 2.14: Single connection failure with impacted application
terminating prematurely. Traffic plots (top), fault injection timeline
(middle), and hardware errors (bottom) are displayed.
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begins flowing only on connections utilized by non-impacted applications.
Traffic does not flow on connections being utilized by the impacted appli-
cation, indicating a network- or application-level error. At time T = 566,
a manual connection restoration is invoked by the fault injector module of
HPCArrow. This manual restoration process triggers a warm swap, which
initializes all links on the masked connection, recalculates new routes and
quiesces the network. Once again, the network quiescence suspends traffic
until the warm swap procedure is successful. Upon a successful warm swap,
traffic begins flowing on connections utilized by non-impacted applications.
Analysis of hardware error logs reveals 86 SSID Request Timeouts and
11 SSID Response Protocol errors, indicating dropped network packets. In
the bottom plot of Fig. 2.14, we observe a sudden spike of errors when the
connection failure is injected at T = 333 seconds. Analysis of application
output logs reveals network quiescence due to automatic connection recovery
and manual warm swap procedures. During network quiescence, additional
SSID Response Protocol errors occur due to the impacted application not
being able to send packets between its assigned compute nodes. Addition-
ally, the UPC-FT workload reports a DMAPP RC TRANSACTION ERROR and ter-
minates upon failure injection. We discuss the cause behind this error in
Section 2.9.5.3.
2.9.4.2 Node and Blade Failures
For the node failure and blade failure fault models, we observed applications
placed on impacted nodes and blades terminating prematurely. This behav-
ior is expected as applications cannot make forward progress upon failure
of a compute component. In the case of node failures, no automatic recov-
ery process is invoked as the HSN is unaffected. This allows non-impacted
applications to continue without disruptions in traffic flow. Upon a blade
failure, however, two Gemini ASICs housed on the impacted blade are taken
out of service. This causes failures in links connected to these Geminis as
well as links connected to other ends of physical links on the failed blade.
An automatic recovery process is triggered to mask the impacted blade and
links, which causes the entire network to be quiesced, new routes installed
and network finally unquiesced. Meanwhile, traffic on other connections is
paused until the automatic recovery process completes successfully. In our
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experiments on the JYC testbed, we observed blade recoveries executing
for approximately 30 seconds. However, we expect this number to increase
significantly for larger systems, as demonstrated in a similar fault injection
campaign on a larger Cray XE system at LANL [23].
We present an example blade failure experiment in Fig. 2.15 to highlight
traffic patterns and system-level events during injection. In this experiment,
we target blade c0-0c2s5 while running application set 1 (see Appendix C).
This experiment specifically impacts the AWP-ODC application running on 32
nodes, as this workload was placed on the targeted blade during injection
and recovery. The impacted application terminates prematurely upon blade
failure and automatic recovery.
In Fig. 2.15, we observe a series of cascading link and connection failures
due to a blade being taken out of service. Two Gemini ASICs (c0-0c2s5g0
and c0-0c2s5g1) housed on the targeted blade are taken offline, causing
outgoing links to fail. Link failures cascade to links connected to other ends
of physical links on the failed blade. In total, 80 link failures across eight
Geminis and four blades are observed.
In the top plot of Fig. 2.15, three traffic curves are presented – one for
the blade that a failure was injected into, a second for remaining blades
utilized by the impacted application, and third for all other blades on the
system. From time T = 0 to T = 355, we observe consistent traffic flow
through all blades. At time T = 341 seconds, a blade failure is injected caus-
ing Geminis c0-0c2s5g0 and c0-0c2s5g1 to fail in all directions. Next, at
time T = 355 seconds, the automatic recovery process is triggered. This re-
covery process requires a route recalculation and network quiescence, which
temporarily suspends network traffic flow on all connections until successful
completion. At time T = 408 seconds, the automatic recovery completes by
successfully masking the impacted blade (i.e. removing it from service). After
completion of the automatic recovery process, traffic begins flowing only on
blades utilized by non-impacted applications. Traffic does not flow on con-
nections being utilized by the impacted application, indicating a network-
or application-level error. At time T = 865, a manual blade restoration is
invoked by the fault injector module of HPCArrow. This manual restora-
tion process triggers a warm swap, which initializes all links on the masked
blade, recalculates new routes and quiesces the network. Once again, the









































































Figure 2.15: Blade failure with impacted application terminating
prematurely. Traffic plots (top), fault injection timeline (middle), and
hardware errors (bottom) are displayed.
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cessful. Upon a successful warm swap, traffic begins flowing only on blades
utilized by non-impacted applications.
Analysis of hardware error logs reveals 754 SSID Request Timeouts, 87
SSID Response Protocol, and 58 SSID Detected Misrouted Packet er-
rors, indicating dropped and misrouted network packets. In the bottom plot
of Fig. 2.15, we observe a sudden spike of errors when the blade failure is
injected at T = 341 seconds. The number of errors continuously increases
until the impacted blade and network links are masked out of service by
the automatic recovery procedure. In output logs of the AWP-ODC, an RCA
ec node failed event is reported due to the workload not being able to
communicate with compute nodes on the failed blade, causing it to termi-
nate immediately. Applications not impacted by the blade failure continue
to execute and terminate naturally at the end of their runs.
2.9.5 Application-Level Resilience
The results obtained from our fault injection campaign have helped in provid-
ing a better understanding of failure scenarios previously observed in [21].
While all system and network recovery procedures completed successfully
within expected time windows, in some cases application workloads were
severely affected due to crashes and hangs. We summarize our observations
for the MPI, Charm++ and PGAS runtime frameworks in this section.
2.9.5.1 Message Passing Interface (MPI)
For MPI applications, we observed premature terminations for the MILC
and PSDNS applications. Upon link and connection failures, MILC re-
ported a number of SOURCE SSID SRSP:REQUEST TIMEOUT messages due to
a GNI RC TRANSACTION ERROR. This message indicates that network packets
were dropped or there was an error in processing after data transaction [54],
which prevented the application from making forward progress.
The PSDNS application terminated prematurely when we targeted links
on chassis where the job was not placed. In the output logs of PSDNS,
we observed UNRECOVERABLE library errors, where the program indicated
that it was unable to request more memory space. It is unclear why this
error is generated in response to a failure in a link not being utilized by
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PSDNS. This behavior is reproducible, as we observed it in multiple runs of
the same experiment. At the same time, we did not observe any premature
terminations in baseline runs of the PSDNS application.
2.9.5.2 Charm++
For Charm++ applications, we observed jobs terminating prematurely and
hanging due to link and connection failures. The LeanMD application ter-
minated prematurely when ioctl(GNI IOC POST RDMA) returned an error
due to encountering an invalid argument to a remote direct memory access
(RDMA) transaction. In some experiments, we observed the LeanMD appli-
cation not making forward progress upon link and connection failures. The
ioctl(GNI IOC POST RDMA) message was continuously logged until the job
was terminated by the application-level scheduler when its maximum allowed
time (walltime) had elapsed.
The AMR application terminated prematurely upon a link or connec-
tion failure, reporting a Assertion msg nbytes > 0 failed error due to an
SMSG send failure. This error indicates that a network packet was dropped
in-flight to its destination Gemini caused by a failure in the communication
path.
The Kripke application did not make forward progress upon injection of a
link or connection failure. No error message was reported in its output logs.
The application-level scheduler continued reporting the job as “running”,
with no indication to the user that forward progress was not being made.
The job was eventually terminated by the application-level scheduler when
its maximum allowed time (walltime) had elapsed.
2.9.5.3 Partitioned Global Address Space (PGAS)
Upon a link or connection failure, the UPC-FT application reported a
DMAPP RC TRANSACTION ERROR and terminated prematurely. This message
indicates that network packets were dropped or there was an error in pro-
cessing after data transaction [54]. This scenario is expected as PGAS ap-
plications are known to be vulnerable to network failures and recoveries [56].
PGAS applications rely on ordered delivery capabilities and atomic memory
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operations, and any disruption to packet delivery and ordering will not allow
the application to make forward progress.
2.9.5.4 Discussion
From our fault injection analysis, we identified that application behavior
in the face of network-level failures is based on the runtime framework used.
Across all frameworks, we observe applications terminating prematurely when
link or connection failures are injected. Moreover, applications utilizing the
Charm++ runtime framework appear to hang upon network-level failures,
with no indication to application-level schedulers. Such a lack of notifications
to services running throughout the system stack leads to waste of system re-
sources and reduces the overall efficiency of HPC systems.
Premature terminations of applications across all frameworks are caused
due to drops of incoming packets, causing applications to immediately throw
errors upon failed assertions. This scenario can be avoided by a network-level
broadcast mechanism that causes application threads to pause computation
upon network failures. An impacted thread could broadcast an emergency
stop/pause message to other threads in the current application, causing them
to temporarily halt computation until network connectivity is restored. This
will allow applications to recover from failures immediately, without having
to revert to previous checkpoints and lose application state. Additionally,
application designers could implement a packet retransmission mechanism.
Gemini ASICs already handle in-flight packets with a sliding window pro-
tocol. Identifying missing or dropped packets in the sliding window could
allow applications to re-request packets from their source, allowing them to
make forward progress when failures are masked and network connectivity is
restored.
At the network level, a two-phase commit protocol could be implemented
to handle lost transactions [56]. With the two-phase commit protocol, nodes
can identify if network transactions have completed before attempting to
make forward progress. At the system level, instrumentation and detection
mechanisms could be implemented to detect processors not making forward
progress. Such detection could be used to notify application-level schedulers
of job hangs, which would allow affected workloads to be terminated early
and free up system resources.
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2.10 Future Work - Cray XC Platform and Aries
Interconnects
The next phase of this project is to execute a similar fault injection campaign
on Voltrino and Mutrino, two Cray XC machines utilizing Aries interconnects
at Sandia National Laboratories. However, due to differences between Gem-
ini and Aries interconnects, our injection tools and analysis methodologies
would require modifications. While system and network architectures may
differ, our general approach to validating network failures and recovery op-
erations on HPC systems remains applicable to newer generations of Cray
platforms.
2.11 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a fault injection campaign on the Blue Waters
JYC testbed at NCSA, with a newly developed software fault injection tool
to induce failures on link, connection, node and blade components on the
Cray XE platform. Analysis of results from our fault injection experiments
reveals a lack of fault tolerance at the application layer for MPI, Charm++
and PGAS runtime frameworks. We also observe that the assumption of
a lossless Gemini network does not hold under failures. Additionally, we
note a lack of notification reporting to applications and application-level
schedulers in the event of system and network failures. In order to improve
the fault-tolerance of their applications and make forward progress in the
face of system- and network-level failures, application designers must take




FAULT INJECTIONS ON SMART POWER
GRID NETWORK ENVIRONMENTS
The programmability of software-defined systems, like smart electric power
grids, has allowed for the widespread adoption of software-defined network-
ing (SDN) in industrial control networks. However, the increased complex-
ity of such networks gives rise to previously unconsidered resiliency issues.
This chapter investigates the impact of faults and attacks on SDN infras-
tructures when deployed in mission-critical environments and proposes an
application- and data plane-based solution to pro-actively monitor system
state and enforce user defined policies. We evaluate our fault models on
a smart power grid simulation running Raincoat, an SDN application that
reroutes and spoofs network traffic to thwart attackers. We show that under
certain faults, (1) applications orchestrating the network become ineffective
and (2) periodically monitoring the state of the network can identify faults
or attacks before they manifest as failures. The results obtained from this
work can aid in enhancing the resiliency of future SDN applications.
3.1 Introduction
The communication network is a fundamental component of a smart power
grid infrastructure, connecting grid devices that span a wide geographic area.
Traditionally, grid communication networks have used the standard Inter-
net Protocol (IP) networking paradigm, but with the increasing complexity
and need for more efficient utilization and distribution of power in today’s
world, this traditional, non-adaptive network model cannot provide the de-
sired programmability and reconfigurability. This need for more dynamic
and reactive network functionality has led to considerations of utilizing the
software-defined networking (SDN) paradigm in place of the traditional IP
stack [57].
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Software-defined networking is an architectural approach to manipulating
computer networks, enabling direct programmability and dynamic reconfig-
urability of network control and resources. The key to the programmability
of SDN networks is the decoupling of the packet routing process from the
forwarding functions of network packets, which are typically performed to-
gether on a single network component. This decoupling ultimately allows
network programmers to design and deploy network control algorithms more
easily and not be constrained by proprietary implementations of network
switches and controllers. While still a nascent approach, SDN has seen com-
mercial deployment in more general network environments. For example, in
the early 2010s, Google deployed B4, a private SDN-based wide area network
to globally connect its data centers and efficiently improve utilization [58].
While SDN provides the agility and reconfigurability demanded by modern
smart grid technologies, system reliability is also a key consideration and
challenge. Critical infrastructures like power grids must be able to maintain
their most crucial services in the face of natural failures and malicious attacks
and be able to recover quickly. Because of the physical separation between
control decision making and forwarding operations, SDN network intelligence
is centralized in a single network component, thus posing a single point of
failure. In order for the power grid industry to consider adopting SDN into
its technologies, understanding system resilience and risks that come with
applying SDN to smart grids is crucial and necessary.
This chapter investigates the impact of faults and attacks on the data ac-
quisition network of a smart grid managed by SDN. Unlike previous fault
injection studies, we specifically focus on the faults that introduce “silent er-
rors” (i.e. errors that allow the executions of SDN applications to continue,
but incorrectly change their functionality). In order to identify and mitigate
silent errors, we propose an application- and data plane-based monitoring
solution (refer to Section 3.2.1 for details on SDN architectures) that pe-
riodically verifies data plane integrity and detects violations of user defined
policies. While we evaluate our solution with a case study on the smart power
grid, the ideas presented in this work can be extended to software-defined












Figure 3.1: SDN architecture overview, showing the application plane (top),
control plane (middle), and data plane (bottom).
3.2 Background
In this section, we introduce concepts related to software-defined networking,
power grid data acquisition networks and how SDNs are integrated into smart
power grids.
3.2.1 Software-Defined Networking
The key principles of software-defined networking are the programmability
and reconfigurability that it provides. These aspects are achieved by a simple
architectural change: unlike traditional IP networks, the control layer of a
software-defined network is decoupled from the data layer.
The general architecture of an SDN network, as shown in Fig. 3.1, can be
divided into three planes or layers: the data plane, the control plane, and
the application plane [59]. The data plane consists of network switches, the
devices responsible for forwarding traffic. The control plane is the central en-
tity of an SDN network, consisting of one or more controllers that maintain
a global view of the overall network and centrally decide how to handle net-
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work traffic. The application plane consists of various user applications (e.g.
network management, quality of service optimization like load balancing, and
system resilience enhancement) which need information about the network
state. These applications also define the network policies which are enforced
by the control plane and executed by the data plane. A benefit of the applica-
tion plane is that applications can be written and provided by third parties,
who are distinct from the routing or controller vendor. This allows network
behavior to be programmed independently from the hardware switches or
software controller. The application plane and the control plane communi-
cate via a northbound application programming interface (API) while the
the data plane and the control plane communicate via a southbound API.
The northbound API contributes to the SDN principle of programmability.
Through this API, controllers expose information about the network state,
enabling network-aware applications that can dynamically react to the live
state of the network. In traditional networks, this information is not shared
with network applications. Additionally, applications can specify their net-
working needs to the controllers. In traditional networks, this communication
is limited and static. At worst, traditional networks have to infer application
needs via traffic analysis and predict the sufficient resources to allocate. In
SDN, this information can be communicated easily and directly.
The southbound API contributes to the SDN principle of reconfigurabil-
ity. The API is commonly standardized by the OpenFlow communications
protocol [60], one of the first standards for software-defined networking. Like
traditional switches, an OpenFlow switch uses one or more flow tables to
route incoming packet sequences. Each packet is matched to an entry in
these flow tables, called a flow rule, which determines how packets should be
processed and forwarded. These flow rules are dynamically created, modified,
or removed by the controller and network applications. In turn, the switch
communicates information about traffic flow it tracks within its tables. This
ability to dynamically generate and reconfigure flow rules proves to be a very
attractive feature of SDN.
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3.2.2 Power Grid Data Acquisition Network
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are commonly
used to transfer information between devices connected to networks of power
grids, gas pipelines and waste water control systems [61]. The SCADA system
of a power grid network, shown in Fig. 3.2, consists of:
• A control center, responsible for communicating and acquiring mea-
surement data from remote devices on the network. The control center
is staffed by human operators and consists of computers and networking
equipment.
• Substations at remote sites, responsible for collecting and aggregating
measurement information of their respective sites and responding to
collection requests from the control center.
• Wide-area network(s), to connect substations at remote sites to the con-
trol center. The wide-area network (WAN) consists of network switches



















Figure 3.2: SCADA system of a power grid network
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3.2.3 SDNs in Smart Power Grids
The programmability of software-defined networking provides several bene-
fits in smart grid communication environments. By orchestrating network
switches with software applications, grid operators can improve functionality
and enhance resilience with more complex algorithms. The adoption of SDN
in smart grid would require augmenting the existing network infrastructure
with SDN controllers and applications specifically developed for smart grid
operation. Figure 3.3 demonstrates an example smart grid communication
network augmented with SDN controllers. Multiple SDN controllers may be
set up at remote sites to manage their respective local area networks. Appli-
cations running on multiple SDN controllers across the entire grid are usually
synchronized with a fixed initialization parameter (e.g. a deterministic seed
like nearest hour). Further details of SDN adoption and implementation on



















Figure 3.3: SCADA system of an SDN-managed power grid network.




In this study, we focus on failures which may be caused by accidental events
(e.g. single event upsets at the bit-level) or induced by malicious actors on-
purpose (e.g. denial of service attacks). Such failures are silent in nature and
are difficult to detect in a timely fashion.
Our fault models target the data plane of a software-defined network and
are described in the following subsections. We specifically study faults that
occur in switches following the OpenFlow switch specification v1.5.1 estab-
lished in [65], and involve corruptions within fields of flow table entries (Sec-
tion 3.3.1), packet processing pipelines (Section 3.3.2), and malicious actions
against the network infrastructure (Section 3.3.3). In this work, we do not
inject faults or replay attacks within the SDN controller, as different im-
plementations of controller software exist. From a security viewpoint, if an
adversary has compromised a central controller or an OpenFlow link be-
tween controller and switches, he or she gains complete visibility into the
data plane.
3.3.1 Flow Table Entry Corruptions
OpenFlow switches process incoming packets by matching packet headers
against installed flow table entries. Packets that do not have entries installed
in any flow tables within a switch are forwarded to the SDN controller via
PacketIn requests for further processing or dropped entirely. Each flow table
entry consists of:
• Header (Match) fields, to match incoming packets against
• Priority, to establish matching precedence of the flow entry
• Counters, to track information about the flow and update with every
matching packet
• Instructions (Actions), to apply to and handle matching packets
• Timeouts, to evict an entry after a fixed or idle duration
• Cookie, to identify a flow to a querying controller
52





Send the packet out all interfaces,
not including the incoming interface.
Output Controller Encapsulate and send the packet to the controller.
Output Local Send the packet to the switch’s local networking stack.
Output Table
Perform actions specified in flow table.
Only for packet-out messages.
Output Ingress Port Send the packet out the input port.
Output Normal
Process the packet using the traditional forwarding
path supported by the switch.
Output Flood
Flood the packet along the minimum spanning tree,
not including the incoming interface.
Enqueue Forward a packet through a queue attached to a port.
Drop Drop the incoming packet.
A complete list of instructions (actions) targeted in this study is specified in
Table 3.1. While switch designers may encode these actions at the hardware
level with different bit-level representations, we assume that bit corruptions
to these fields cause one action to be interpreted as another. Furthermore,
due to our fault injection mechanism, a corrupted flow always contains fields
with valid interpretations. In hardware switches, however, corrupt flows may
contain fields with invalid representations. In such cases, the behavior of the
hardware switch logic is undefined.
Bit-level corruptions of flow table entry fields could cause unintended
packet routing behavior. For example, corruptions in header fields could
cause packets to be matched with a flow not intended for them. Corruptions
in action fields could cause packets that should be dropped or forwarded to
the controller to be routed out on network ports. Additionally, attackers
could exploit potential vulnerabilities at the OS/controller layer to manipu-
late OpenFlow switches and add, drop or modify entire flow table entries.
In this work, we specifically inject corruptions into action fields to change
their interpretation to another valid action or cause the entire flow entry to
be dropped (see Fig 3.4). We specifically target action fields as corruptions
would have adverse effects on packet routing. Such corruptions are silent
and not detected until either (1) an error in the switch manifests as a failure
elsewhere, or (2) installed flows are verified against a known set of valid flows
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Header#1 Priority Counters Actions Timeouts Cookie
Header#2 Priority Counters Actions Timeouts Cookie
Header#3 Priority Counters Actions Timeouts Cookie
Header#4 Priority Counters Actions Timeouts Cookie
Header#5 Priority Counters Actions Timeouts Cookie
Flow Table
OpenFlow Network Switch
Figure 3.4: Flow table entry corruptions to action fields
by the SDN controller or an application.
3.3.2 Pipeline Processing Manipulations
OpenFlow switches process packets through one or more flow tables in a
pipeline, with each flow table consisting of one or more entries. Packet pro-
cessing occurs in two phases - the ingress pipeline, and egress pipeline (see
Fig. 3.5). Upon matching with flow entries in one or more tables, actions
defined with matching entries are added to an “action set” to be executed
at the end of the current pipeline. Beyond executing actions in Table 3.1, a
flow table entry can also direct matching packets to tables further down in
the pipeline. Any further flow table entries matching with the packet being
processed will have their actions added to the action set as well. All ac-
tions added to the action set are executed at the end of their corresponding
pipeline, i.e. when a flow table entry does not redirect a packet further into
the pipeline or when the last flow table has processed a packet.
However, if an incoming packet does not match with a flow table entry,
actions associated with the table-miss flow entry (configured by the SDN
controller) are executed. This could involve dropping the packet, forwarding
the packet to the SDN controller or redirecting the packet to a flow table
further down the pipeline.
A disruption in either of these pipelines could cause unintended packet
routing behavior. Corruptions of pipeline forwarding actions could cause




















Action Set = { } Action Set = {actions}
OpenFlow Switch
Figure 3.5: Simplified OpenFlow packet processing pipeline. Corruptions
are injected as (1) packets traverse through pipelines, and (2) into action
sets.
may not be handled correctly. Additionally, corruptions in the table-miss
flow entry could cause packets to be dropped instead of continuing through
the pipeline or being forwarded to the SDN controller.
In this work, we target corruptions of pipeline action sets and table-miss
entry actions. We inject faults such that values contained in action sets or
the table-miss entry take on valid representations different from the original
(e.g. a “forward to controller” action is modified to “drop” packet instead).
3.3.3 Network Overloading
In the network overloading scenario, an adversary attempts to disable or
cause degraded performance on OpenFlow switches by flooding them with an
excessive number of requests from a connected host (see Fig. 3.6). Excessive
requests forwarded to the controller saturate the southbound OpenFlow link
between the switch and SDN controller or overload the controller itself. This
type of attack is commonly known as PacketIn flooding [66]. Depending on
controller and switch policies to handle an increased traffic load, this attack
could lead to a denial-of-service scenario across the network.
In this work, we emulate a network overloading scenario by sending an
excessive number of packets from multiple hosts connected to SDN managed
switches. Network packets are generated from arbitrary network ports on
hosts to ensure that flow table entries for these packets do not exist. This
approach guarantees that PacketIn requests are sent to the SDN controller













Figure 3.6: Network overload attack
3.4 Fault Injection and Analysis Framework
In order to systematically study the effects of faults, errors and failures on
SDN infrastructures, we have developed an SDN fault injection work flow
and analysis framework as part of this work. In this section, we describe
our fault injector, analysis tools, and overall work flow applied to our fault
injection experiments.
3.4.1 SDN Fault Injector
The SDN fault injector module runs as an independent entity on the simu-
lation system and is composed of wrappers around the OpenVSwitch (OVS)
administrative interface and traffic generation scripts. This module is re-
sponsible for the selection, timing and injection of faults into target network
switches being managed by a centralized SDN controller. The injection mech-
anisms employed in our fault injector module are summarized in Table 3.2.
The fault injector is executed with superuser privileges on the simulation
system. A user selects the fault model to execute, target components (i.e.
network switches, hosts, flow tables and entries) and time delay. The injector
is written in Python and can easily be integrated into larger applications for
testing and development of SDN systems.
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switches
3.4.2 Network Testbed
Our networking testbed is composed of Mininet [12], the Pox SDN controller
[13], OpenVSwitch (OVS) switches [14], and Automatak DNP3 Applications
[15]. Mininet is a network emulator that emulates hosts, links, switches,
and controllers on a single machine by utilizing lightweight virtualization to
enable a single system to host a complete network, running the same kernel,
system, and user code. The emulated hosts behave like real machines and can
run arbitrary programs. The virtual links, switches, and hosts behave like
real hardware, i.e. packets are sent out on interfaces visible to an end user.
Automatak DNP3 applications are used to generate network traffic between
virtual hosts provided by Mininet. Figure 3.7 describes how the fault injector
and simulated environment are set up. The fault injection and packet capture
tools run as independent entities in the simulation environment. After fault
injection is complete, packet captures are saved and analyzed offline. We
























Figure 3.7: Fault injection and analysis framework
3.4.3 Analysis Framework
To study the effects of faults on network traffic, we capture packet traces for
output ports on each network switch being managed by the centralized SDN
controller using tcpdump [67]. Packet captures are analyzed offline using
tshark (Wireshark’s command line utility) [11], with additional logic written
in Python. Analysis scripts are used to identify anomalies like misrouted
or dropped packets, delays in transmission, and other interesting events in
captured traffic flows (see Fig. 3.8).
3.4.4 Experiment Workflow
For each experiment, our fault injection workflow involves launching a sim-
ulated network topology using Mininet and a central SDN controller using
Pox. Next, we launch DNP3 applications to generate traffic between virtual
hosts on the network. We also launch the tcpdump utility to capture net-







Figure 3.8: Analysis example, identifying events of interest in Wireshark
injection tool is used to manipulate the state of flow tables and inject faults
into network switches. Once faults have been injected and failures observed,
we shut down network captures and the rest of the simulation environment to
prepare for the next experiment. Captured packet traces are analyzed offline
using tools described in Section 3.4.3 to identify possible failure scenarios.



















Figure 3.9: Experiment workflow for SDN fault injection
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3.5 Case Study - Raincoat for Smart Power Grids
To demonstrate the impact on real world SDN infrastructures, we evaluate
our fault models on a simulation of a data acquisition network of a smart
electric power grid. The data acquisition network consists of a control center
and multiple substations (end devices) connected over a wide-area network
(WAN). Network switches at the first hop from the control center and end
devices are designated as edge switches. The control center runs a supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) system which periodically queries
end devices for measurements using the Distributed Network Protocol v3
(DNP3). Upon receiving a SCADA DNP3 read request, substations send
their response containing power measurements over the network.
When designing such systems, the remote insider threat model is com-
monly considered. Attackers can bypass standard security measures (such as
firewalls) and establish themselves on core computing devices on the network.
Such a level of access allows attackers to inspect and potentially modify net-
work traffic from the penetrated computing device. For example, the cyber
attack on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2015 involved malicious
actors establishing a foothold within the power grid network and remotely
controlling operator stations to hijack SCADA systems. The attackers gained
access to operator stations by harvesting credentials through spear phishing
methods and caused a blackout that affected more than 225,000 residents
[68].
In this case study, we inject faults into network switches administered by
an SDN controller running the Raincoat application. Raincoat, proposed
in [69], is an algorithm that randomizes data acquisitions in power systems
with the goal of exposing and misleading attackers as they observe network
traffic to prepare their attack strategies. At runtime, a single data acquisition
operation issued by the control center to all substation devices is transformed
into multiple rounds of data delivery. An example execution run of the
Raincoat algorithm is demonstrated in Fig. 3.10.
Edge switches are configured to route DNP3 read requests from the SCADA
master to the Raincoat application, which forwards these requests to each
substation multiple times. For each round of responses, Raincoat randomly
designates a subset of responding substations as “online” and allows their
measurements to be forwarded to the controller. The remainder of responses
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Figure 3.10: Example execution of the Raincoat algorithm [69]
from “offline” substations are intercepted and substituted with decoy mea-
surements instead. Over the course of all responses to a single read request,
Raincoat guarantees that at least one response per substation will be gen-
uine. The SCADA system in the control center is synchronized with the
Raincoat algorithm to extract genuine measurements, while the attacker ob-
serves both genuine and decoy measurements which are indistinguishable on
the network. Further details of the Raincoat framework can be found in [69].
3.5.1 Fault Injection Campaign
We conducted our fault injection experiments on the network topology shown
in Fig. 3.11. The topology consists of 9 substations, 8 edge switches, and
one control center. Edge switches are managed by a single SDN controller
(switch–controller links omitted from figure) running the Raincoat applica-
tion. As described in Section 3.4, the network topology is simulated with
Mininet, OpenVSwitch and the Pox SDN controller. The control center
and substations are Automatak DNP3 applications running on virtualized
Mininet hosts. In total, our campaign consists of 235 unique faults injections.
We repeat our fault injection campaign three times to verify deterministic
behavior of the simulated system under failures.











Figure 3.11: Network topology used in fault injection experiments
3.5.1.1 Flow Table Entry Corruptions
The Raincoat application installs three sets of flow table entries for each
edge switch managed by the SDN controller (see Fig. 3.12). Packets from
the SCADA master to substations are forwarded to the SDN controller at
all times via a “Output to Controller” entry on all edge switches. Upon
receiving these packets from edge switches, the Raincoat application selec-
tively forwards DNP3 read requests to “online” substations. Additionally,
responses from “online” substations are handled with flow table entries that
simply forward packets out of the intended port, i.e. to the SCADA master
in the control center. Responses from “offline” substations are handled by
forwarding to the Raincoat application running on top of the SDN controller.
The Raincoat application then obfuscates original measurements within an
acceptable tolerance before forwarding to the SCADA master.
Fault injection experiments to study the flow table entry corruption fault
model are summarized in Table 3.3. Descriptions of flow table entry actions
may be found in Table 3.1. Each action is injected once per edge switch,























Figure 3.12: Flow table entries installed in a Raincoat managed edge switch.
Requests from the SCADA master are shown in blue, whereas responses
from substations are shown in red.




































Table 3.4: Pipeline Processing Corruption Experiments
Component Initial Value Injected Value
Action Set
Output Action(s), i.e.
forward to controller OR









3.5.1.2 Pipeline Processing Corruptions
While Raincoat does not utilize multiple flow tables in packet processing
pipelines, we modify the flow table entry installation procedure to allow us
to study corruptions in pipeline processing. Instead of installing flow entries
in the first available flow table, we deliberately install entries in a table further
down in the pipeline. Additionally, we configure table-miss entries to forward
packets to the next flow table in the pipeline sequence via “Goto” actions.
This ensures ingress packets are processed through multiple flow tables before
the intended action is applied to them and allows us to inject corruptions
into the pipeline. Our injection experiments related to the pipeline processing
corruption fault model are summarized in Table 3.4. Each fault is injected
once per edge switch, giving us 24 unique fault injections for this fault model.
3.5.1.3 Network Overloading
To simulate a network overloading scenario, we launch traffic generators on a
subset of connected substations. These traffic generators continuously send
an excessive number of network packets (as fast as the simulator allows) to
connected edge switches. Depending on whether substations are considered
“online” or “offline” by Raincoat and network switches, these packets are
forwarded to the SDN controller or to the SCADA master in the control
center. We conduct the network overloading experiment three times to verify
deterministic and repeatable behavior.
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3.5.2 Failure Scenarios
In our analysis of captured network traces, we identify faults manifesting as
failures in the form of (1) SCADA timeouts, (2) measurement obfuscation
failures, and (3) denial-of-service. These failure scenarios and their causes
are described in Sections 3.5.2.1 – 3.5.2.3.
3.5.2.1 SCADA Timeout
In the SCADA timeout scenario, the SCADA master running in the con-
trol center receives an incomplete set of measurements within an acceptable
period from substations responding to a data acquisition command. This
happens when requests from the SCADA master are dropped en route to
a substation, or when responses from a substation are dropped en route to
the master. In some cases, packets from a substation eventually arrive at
the master due to retransmissions, but beyond our expected time limit from
when the read request is sent out.
3.5.2.2 Measurement Obfuscation Failure
In the measurement obfuscation failure scenario, packets from substations
that should be treated as “offline” by the Raincoat algorithm are transmit-
ted beyond edge switches into the wide area network instead. This occurs
when packets are incorrectly routed through the network instead of being
forwarded up to the SDN controller and applications. This causes genuine
measurements from “offline” substations to become visible to an adversary
observing network traffic, rendering the Raincoat algorithm ineffective.
3.5.2.3 Denial-of-Service
The Raincoat algorithm requires edge switches to forward SCADA read re-
quests up to the SDN controller via OpenFlow PacketIn requests. However,
flooding a large number of these requests saturates the OpenFlow channel
between edge switches and the SDN controller. This causes other requests
to remain pending or be dropped, leading to a denial-of-service scenario in
which power grid data acquisition cannot continue. Normal functionality
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of the network is only restored when a system administrator intervenes and
disables the malicious host that is flooding the network.
3.5.3 Results
Failure scenarios that resulted from faults injected during our campaign are
summarized in Table 3.5.
Raincoat installs flow table entries that redirect incoming packets to (1)
the SDN controller or (2) out on a specific port (see Fig. 3.12). Upon inject-
ing faults that modify flow table entries to forward packets out on all ports
(or when flooding packets across the spanning tree), we observe traffic from
DNP3 substations considered “offline” by Raincoat being forwarded to the
control center, instead of being forwarded to the SDN controller for obfus-
cation. Modifying actions to output to “Table”, “Ingress Port”, “Enqueue”,
or “Drop” causes DNP3 packets to be dropped or sent back to the sender,
instead of being forwarded to the control center or SDN controller. This
eventually causes SCADA timeouts, where a full set of measurements is not
received within an acceptable window of time (10 seconds in our experiment).
Additionally, we observe a number of SCADA timeouts (i.e. data acquisi-
tion requests pending for longer than 10 seconds) upon corrupting table-miss
actions and action sets in processing pipelines. By clearing action sets as
packets progressed through their ingress pipeline, packets are immediately
dropped. By corrupting table-miss actions to “Drop”, we are able to drop
packets instead of continuing through the pipeline. We also observe a mea-
surement obfuscation failure when a table-miss action is corrupted to “For-
ward to controller”. The corrupt table-miss action sends packets from “on-
line” substations to the Raincoat application instead of the SCADA master.
Raincoat responds by obfuscating measurements contained in these packets
before forwarding them to the SCADA master. However, this scenario can
be avoided by distinguishing packets from “online” and “offline” substations
within the Raincoat algorithm’s control logic.
Finally, upon overloading the network, we are able to create a denial-of-
service scenario where data acquisition could not continue due to the SDN
controller being non-responsive. While the network is being overloaded, the
SDN controller does not respond to PacketIn requests from edge switches.
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Additionally, no new flow table entries are installed by the SDN controller.
This causes DNP3 requests and responses to be dropped upon arriving at an
edge switch once existing flows have expired.
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3.6 Resiliency Recommendations
The failure scenarios described in Section 3.5.2 can be overcome by leveraging
data plane monitoring and metering features provided in newer versions of
OpenFlow. In this section, we propose three approaches to mitigate failures
described in our power grid case study.
3.6.1 Continuous Monitoring via SDN Applications
To identify silent corruptions before they manifest as failures, we propose an
application-based solution that continuously monitors the state of the data
plane and detects corruptions of flow table state. Our solution leverages
features made possible by SDNs – network visibility and programmability –
that are not achievable with traditional networking. This approach to net-
work monitoring requires only minor changes to the northbound interface
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between SDN applications and the controller. Instead of directly interacting
with the controller, applications route their requests via an auxiliary moni-
toring application, as shown in Fig. 3.13.
Figure 3.13: Data plane monitoring via auxiliary SDN application
Upon receiving flow installation requests from other SDN applications, the
monitoring application forwards these requests to the controller. At the same
time, the application caches flow information contained in these requests into
a “golden” set. The integrity of flow table entries is periodically verified for
each network switch. Any deviation from the cached “golden” set causes an
alarm to be raised within the monitoring application. This periodic verifica-
tion approach detects bit-level corruptions as well as malicious modifications
of flow tables.
Inconsistencies in flow table states cause an alarm to be triggered within
the monitoring application. A system administrator can respond to alarms
raised by taking precautionary measures like scanning the network for un-
known hosts or identifying faulty switches. While we implement our monitor-
ing solution as a separate SDN application, its functionality can be integrated
into existing applications without significant additional overhead.
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3.6.2 Rate-Limiting via Metering Flows
Beyond monitoring flow table states, we can mitigate denial-of-service failure
scenarios by metering traffic flows installed in flow tables. OpenFlow v1.3.0
and beyond provide a meter table on each network switch, which allows traffic
to be managed based on the rate of incoming packets. We can configure
per-flow meters to implement rate-limiting by constraining bandwidth and
limiting excessive requests to controllers and other hosts on the network.
For example, we can define a simple meter flow rule for flow table entries
on each network switch to limit the number of requests and responses to 1
packet per second. In OpenFlow, such a metering policy would be defined
with the following parameters:
• Band Type: drop, which drops packets beyond the specified rate
• Rate: 1 packet (per second)
• Burst (granularity): 1 packet
This rate limit metering policy will limit SCADA requests to 10 per data
collection round (10 seconds) by dropping packets in violation. While this
approach will not prevent a malicious host from sending network packets, it
can be used to protect against spamming switches and the SDN controller,
potentially avoiding a denial-of-service attack.
OpenFlow v1.5.1 supports an additional band type called dscp remark.
Specifying dscp remark in place of drop as the band type in a meter entry
would allow the network switch to differentiate between senders and de-
prioritize or drop packets from malicious or unknown hosts, while allowing
genuine hosts to continue sending and receiving packets. However, the dscp
remark band type is not supported in OpenVSwitch’s implementation of
OpenFlow at the time of this publication, and hence not evaluated in this
work. Furthermore, there is limited support of meter tables on hardware
implementations of OpenFlow network switches. Thus, this approach must
be carefully evaluated with the available hardware and software stack when
deployed in a mission-critical environment.
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3.6.3 Failover Flow Table Entries
We can also leverage multiple flow tables in the OpenFlow processing pipeline
to provide a failover or redundant flow table entry, if the original entry is
corrupted or evicted (see Fig. 3.14). Installing a failover flow table entry
further down in the pipeline allows switches to process packets when the
original flow table entry is corrupted. When a network packet arrives at a
switch with a corrupt flow entry, it will not be matched in the original table
causing the packet to rely on the table-miss entry for routing decisions. The
table-miss entry will force the packet to a table further down in the pipeline
where it can be matched with a redundant failover entry instead and continue
processing as intended by the application. This approach mitigates incorrect




















Figure 3.14: Pipeline processing with failover flow table entry
To implement this failover strategy, application designers will have to in-
stall redundant flows in separate tables on a network switch. Additionally,
the table-miss entry in the flow table containing the primary flow will have to
be configured to forward requests to a table containing the redundant flow.
We tested our implementation of failover entries by evicting the primary flow
in a target network switch. In all tests, the table-miss entry was activated
which forwarded the ingress packet to the table containing the redundant
flow. The ingress packet was processed as expected in all cases.
While this is a quick solution to handling corrupt flows, it comes with
several caveats:
• The failover table entry is only utilized if the original flow table entry
does not match with the incoming packet, i.e. this solution does not
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apply to corrupt original entries with valid representations of other
actions.
• The table-miss entry can only forward packets to tables further down
in the pipeline. This failover strategy cannot be applied to the final
table in a packet processing pipeline.
• This solution relies on the table-miss entry forwarding to the correct
flow table in the processing pipeline. This may not occur for switches
with widespread faults or deliberate attacks that target multiple flow
tables or entries, where the table-miss entry is also corrupted.
3.7 Related Work
In this chapter, we covered faults and attacks against SDN infrastructures in
mission-critical systems. A number of past works have evaluated the reliabil-
ity and security of SDN systems. [70] introduces the idea of using SDNs in
industrial networks to improve security. Existing works [71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76]
cover the impact of specific attacks against SDN systems. Additionally, [77],
[78] cover attacks and fault injections in the control plane. However, unlike
our work, [77] focuses on injecting attacks in the Southbound API between
network hubs and SDN controllers, and [78] performs fault injections within
specific implementations of SDN controllers. To the best of our knowledge,
our work is unique as it considers failures at the OpenFlow networking switch
level in industrial control systems, independent of controller or application.
3.8 Future Work
While this project lays the groundwork for understanding failures in mission-
critical SDN infrastructures, several aspects are yet to be addressed:
• Validating fault models with hardware testbeds
Our experimental approach made use of software simulators to emu-
late networking environments. Consequently, some of our assumptions
may not necessarily hold true with industrial grade systems. Ideally,
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we would like to validate our fault models with a physical networking
testbed comprising of network components from various vendors.
• Validating fault models with additional applications
In this work, we covered the case study of Raincoat on the smart power
grid. Future work could validate our proposed fault models with more
complex applications and identify additional failure scenarios.
• Singular point of failure
In SDN architectures, the controller is a singular point of failure. Using
the results of this work, we would like to ascertain whether automatic
failures could cause the controller to fail and render the network unus-
able.
• Attacks against SDN systems
Future work could identify whether an adversary could leverage the
results presented in this work to cause attacks against SDN systems to
succeed.
3.9 Conclusion
In this work, we demonstrated that our fault models can create an inconsis-
tent state between the decoupled data and control planes on SDN systems.
Such inconsistencies often lead to errors which manifest as failures in the
environment that render the SDN controller and application ineffective. As
demonstrated in the smart power grid case study, even applications with
minimal interaction with the control plane are susceptible errors and failures
in the data plane. However, equipped with results from this project, develop-
ers could integrate recommendations proposed in Section 3.6 to enhance the
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FAULT INJECTION COMMANDS FOR
CRAY XE PLATFORM
The fault injector module of HPCArrow supports execution of arbitrary fail-
ures and restorations on link, connection, node and blade components of a
Cray XE machine with Gemini ASIC routers. Commands are executed on
a system management workstation (SMW) by an administrator. Fault in-
jection commands and their parameters are summarized in Table A.1, and
restoration commands are summarized in Table A.2. Note that all restoration
commands must be run as the ‘crayadm’ user on the SMW.




xtmemio -w ::{gemini} {0x0006000128 | \
(link row << 22) | (link col << 19)} 2 0
{gemini}: Component name of targeted Gemini.
{link row} and {link col}: Row and column of link.
For example, a target link "c0-0c0s1g0l45" should be
specified as:
{gemini} = "c0-0c0s1g0"
{link row} = 4
{link col} = 5
For connection failures, the command must be repeated
for each link in the target connection.
Node xtnmi {node}
{node}: Component name of targeted node.
For example, {node} = "c0-0c0s3n2"
Note: Must be run as ‘crayadm’
Blade
rsh -l root {blade} "/opt/bin/i2c \
2:0x60/2=0x02,0x00"
{blade}: Component name of targeted blade.
For example, {blade} = "c0-0c0s3"
Table A.2: Component Restoration Commands
Component(s) Command Comments
Link xtwarmswap -s {link}, {link end} -p p0 {link}: Failed link to restore{link end}: Other end of failed link to restore
Connection xtwarmswap -s {links} -p p0
{links}: Comma separated list of links
to restore from impacted connection.
Other ends of impacted links must also be
specified.
Node xtbootsys --reboot -L CNL0 {node}
{node}: Component name of node to restore.
Note: Requires an interactive terminal session.
Blade
Remove: xtwarmswap --force --remove {blade}
Swap: xtwarmswap --add {blade}
Boot: xtcli boot CNL0 {blade}
{blade}: Component name of blade to restore.





JYC is a 96-node Cray XE/XK testbed at the National Center for Super-
computing Applications (NCSA). The machine consists of one cabinet (three
chassis) with 56 XE nodes, 28 XK nodes and 14 service nodes.
System components are referred to by their component names (cnames).
Component names are based on their physical locations within the system
and follow a hierarchical convention. Cabinets are referred to by their X and
Y position in the physical machine layout. Since JYC is a single cabinet
system, the cabinet name is simply c0-0. Chassis within each cabinet are
referred to by their vertical position, with c0 being the bottommost chassis
and c2 being to topmost chassis within a cabinet. Blades within each chassis
are referred to by their position from left to right, with s0 being the leftmost
blade and s7 being the rightmost blade. The two Gemini ASICs on each
blade are referred to by g0 and g1. Finally, the four nodes on each blade
are referred to by n0, n1, n2, and n3. Nodes n0 and n1 are connected to
Gemini g0, whereas nodes n2 and n3 are connected to Gemini g1. Figure B.1
demonstrates the layout and naming convention on JYC. Node identifiers
(NIDs) are also provided within node boxes. Examples of component names
mapped to NIDs are provided in Table B.1.
Table B.1: Example Component Names on JYC



































































































































































Figure B.1: JYC system overview with node types and identifiers
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APPENDIX C
APPLICATION SETS AND PARAMETERS
In order to study the impact of injected faults and recoveries across the entire
target system, we simultaneously launch a set of workloads for each experi-
ment. Launching workloads across the entire system allows us to identify fail-
ures that propagate or cascade through the system and impact applications
running further away from the injected component. Applications are chosen
such that each set has a mix of runtime frameworks, application sizes, and
overall system utilization. In our injection campaign, the HPCArrow work-
load generator is configured with eight unique application sets. Tables C.1
– C.8 define the following fields for their respective application sets:
• Application Name. For Charm++ applications, we distinguish be-
tween symmetric multiprocessing (SMP) and HugePages variants.
• Size, in terms of number of nodes and node types.
• Processes per node (PPN). Cray XE nodes support 32 simultaneous
processes/threads whereas Cray XK nodes support 16. When executing
on a combination of node types, the number of processes per node is
limited to the minimum number of processes supported by each node
type. Additionally, Charm++ SMP applications abstract processing
elements (PEs) from available processor cores. Effectively, each PE is
composed of multiple threads. For such applications, we define their
PPN as number of PEs× number of threads.
• Node Identifiers, describing the placement of applications within the
system. Application locations are also visualized in Figs. C.1 – C.8.
• Parameters, describing input files and parameter values for each ap-
plication.
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Table C.1: Application Set 1 Configuration
Application Name Size PPN Node IDs Parameters
AWP-ODC 32 XE 16 32− 63
Default benchmark parameters
NX = NY = NX = 712
NPX = NPY = NPZ = 8







LeanMD (HugePages) 8 XK 16 72− 75, 84− 87




UPC-FT 4 XE 32 6, 7, 24, 25







































































































Figure C.1: Application set 1 placement
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Table C.2: Application Set 2 Configuration
Application Name Size PPN Node IDs Parameters
AMR (HugePages) 4 XE 32 2, 3, 28, 29
MAX DEPTH = 10
BLOCK SIZE = 8
ITERATIONS = 175
LB FREQ = 3
ARRAY DIM = 512
AMR (SMP) 32 XE 2× 16 32− 63
MAX DEPTH = 10
BLOCK SIZE = 8
ITERATIONS = 800
LB FREQ = 3
ARRAY DIM = 512
AWP-ODC 2 XE 32 15, 16
Default benchmark parameters
NX = NY = NX = 368
NPX = NPY = NPZ = 4







LeanMD (HugePages) 4 XE 32 12, 13, 18, 19




LeanMD (HugePages) 2 XE 32 11, 20




UPC-FT 4 XE, 28 XK 16 64− 95
















































































































Figure C.2: Application set 2 placement
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Table C.3: Application Set 3 Configuration
Application Name Size PPN Node IDs Parameters
AMR (HugePages) 2 XE 32 60, 61
MAX DEPTH = 10
BLOCK SIZE = 8
ITERATIONS = 95
LB FREQ = 3
ARRAY DIM = 512
AWP-ODC 4 XK 16 74, 75, 84, 85
Default benchmark parameters
NX = NY = NX = 364
NPX = NPY = NPZ = 4
LeanMD (HugePages) 4 XE 32 6, 7, 24, 25




UPC-FT 2 XE 32 16, 17









































































































Figure C.3: Application set 3 placement
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Table C.4: Application Set 4 Configuration
Application Name Size PPN Node IDs Parameters
AMR (HugePages) 2 XE 32 16, 17
MAX DEPTH = 10
BLOCK SIZE = 8
ITERATIONS = 95
LB FREQ = 3
ARRAY DIM = 512
AWP-ODC 4 XE, 28 XK 16 64− 95
Default benchmark parameters
NX = NY = NX = 712
NPX = NPY = NPZ = 8







UPC-FT 8 XE 32 34− 37, 58− 61









































































































Figure C.4: Application set 4 placement
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Table C.5: Application Set 5 Configuration
Application Name Size PPN Node IDs Parameters
AMR (SMP) 36 XE, 28 XK 1× 16 32− 95
MAX DEPTH = 10
BLOCK SIZE = 8
ITERATIONS = 850
LB FREQ = 3
ARRAY DIM = 512
AWP-ODC 2 XE 32 18, 19
Default benchmark parameters
NX = NY = NX = 368
NPX = NPY = NPZ = 4
UPC-FT 4 XE 32 6, 7, 24, 25







































































































Figure C.5: Application set 5 placement
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Table C.6: Application Set 6 Configuration
Application Name Size PPN Node IDs Parameters
AMR (HugePages) 2 XE 2× 16 20, 21
MAX DEPTH = 10
BLOCK SIZE = 8
ITERATIONS = 95
LB FREQ = 3
ARRAY DIM = 512







LeanMD (HugePages) 4 XE 32 40− 55




MILC 16 XE 32 32− 39, 56− 63




MILC 2 XE 32 16, 17




NAMD (SMP) 4 XE 2× 16 6, 7, 24, 25 Input: stmv.4.namd
PSDNS 28 XK, 4 XE 16 64− 95 Dimensions: 512













































































































Figure C.6: Application set 6 placement
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Table C.7: Application Set 7 Configuration
Application Name Size PPN Node IDs Parameters
AMR (HugePages) 4 XE 32 12, 13, 18, 19
MAX DEPTH = 10
BLOCK SIZE = 8
ITERATIONS = 175
LB FREQ = 3
ARRAY DIM = 512







LeanMD (HugePages) 8 XK 16 64− 67, 92− 95




MILC 4 XE 32 2, 3, 28, 29




NAMD (SMP) 16 XE 2× 16 32− 39, 56− 63 Input: stmv.16.namd











































































































Figure C.7: Application set 7 placement
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Table C.8: Application Set 8 Configuration
Application Name Size PPN Node IDs Parameters
AMR (HugePages) 4 XK 16 64, 65, 94, 95
MAX DEPTH = 10
BLOCK SIZE = 8
ITERATIONS = 105
LB FREQ = 3
ARRAY DIM = 512







LeanMD (HugePages) 2 XE 32 48, 49




MILC 4 XE 32 78− 81




NAMD (SMP) 4 XE 2× 16 36, 37, 58, 59 Input: stmv.4.namd











































































































Figure C.8: Application set 8 placement
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